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WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD INTENTIONS:
THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEMISE OF A TASK FORCE
EXAMINING THE DRUGS-VIOLENCE
INTERRELATIONSHIP
Deborah W. Denno*
Between 1994-1996, I was one of twenty-eight members of a
Drugs->Violence Task Force ("Task Force") created to report to the
United States Sentencing Commission specific findings, conclusions,

and recommendations concerning the interrelationship (if any)
between drugs and violence. 1 The Task Force developed from the

* Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., University of Virginia, 1974; M.A.,
University of Toronto, 1975; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1982; J.D., University of
Pennsylvania, 1989. This Essay's points of view are mine only and do not necessarily
represent the views of any other individual or organization associated with the
Drugs-Violence Task Force.
The Task Force was chaired by Gordon P. Waldo, Professor, School of Criminology &
Criminal Justice, Florida State University. The eight ex-officio members of the Task Force
(who sent representatives to participate directly in the Task Force meetings and discussions)
were, at the time: The Honorable Lee P. Brown, Former Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy; H. Talbot "Sandy" D'alemberte, President, Florida State University; Peter B.
Edelman, Counselor to the Secretary, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services; The
Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senator, Massachusetts; The Honorable A. David
Mazzone, Commissioner, U.S. Sentencing Commission; The Honorable Janet Reno, Attorney
General of the United States; The Honorable Robert C. Scott, U.S. Representative, Virginia;
and The Honorable Christine Todd Whitman, Governor of New Jersey. In addition to
Professor Waldo and myself, the remaining twenty Task Force members were: Theodore G.
Chiricos, Professor, School of Criminology & Criminal Justice, Florida State University;
Jeanette Covington, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Rutgers University;
Patricia G. Erickson, Senior Scientist, Social & Evaluation Research Department, Addiction
Research Foundation; Paul J. Goldstein, Associate Professor, School of Public Health,
University of Illinois at Chicago; Leroy Gould, Professor, School of Criminology & Criminal
Justice, Florida State University; Mary Frances Harkenrider, Counsel to the Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Tonya A. Harris,
Associate Professor, School of Nursing, Florida Sate University; Edward Jurith, General
Counsel, Office of National Drug Control Policy; Susan Katzenelson, Director, Office of Policy
Analysis, U.S. Sentencing Commission; Gary Kleck, Professor, School of Criminology &
Criminal Justice, Florida State University; Kathy Makinen, Research Assistant, School of
Criminology & Criminal Justice, Florida State University; The Honorable Consuelo B.
Marshall, Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California; Phyllis
Newton, Staff Director, U.S. Sentencing Commission; David Rasmussen, Professor,
Department of Economics & Program Director, Policy Sciences Center, Florida State
University; Bruce Stout, Policy Advisor, Office of the Governor of New Jersey; Bobby Vassar,
Legislative Aide to Congressman Robert Scott; Sarah Vogelsberg, Assistant to the Counsel to
the Secretary for Drug Abuse Policy, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services; and
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Sentencing Commission's first sponsored symposium in 1993
entitled Drugs and Violence in America.2 The symposium was a
success, but it left open many questions. Moreover, earlier task
forces and commissions could not provide adequate answers; they
focused either on drugs or violence and only rarely (and then,
superficially) on the association between the two.3 The Task Force
constituted the first organized effort to study the drugs-violence
4
interrelationship exclusively.
This Essay discusses briefly the Task Force's goals, development,
unreconciled conclusions and recommendations, as well as its
ultimate demise. Much of the Essay's recount stems from the Task
Force's Preliminary "Final" Report ("Final Report" or "Report")5
which was never published and never agreed upon by all of the Task
Force members. Attempts to gauge and unify Task Force members'
views of the Final Report, particularly the Report's conclusions and
recommendations, made clear the controversy of the subject
6
matter.
In general, much of the controversy concerning how to approach
the drugs-violence problem reflects two conflicting and long-held
views of drugs and crime:
the criminal justice view, which
emphasizes detecting and punishing drug offenders,7 and the public
Ronald Weich, General Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee on Labor & Human Resources. See
Preliminary "Final" Report to the United States Sentencing Commission from the
Drugs--Violence Task Force 3 (June 27, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author and with Albany Law Review) [hereinafter Final Report].
2 See Symposium, Drugs & Violence in America, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N i-ii (1993)
(explaining that in response to the overwhelming need to curb drug abuse and violence in the
United States, Congress mandated that the U.S. Sentencing Commission critically evaluate
criminal justice policies and investigate ways to improve the policies).
3 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that some of the conclusions derived from
these earlier efforts are nevertheless relevant to the Final Report).
4 See id. (explaining that the need for a better understanding of the relationship between
drugs and violence sparked the cooperative effort of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the
School of Criminology & Criminal Justice at Florida State University).
5 See id.
6 Many of the Final Report's conclusions and recommendations stem from the discussion
and content of Task Force meetings held over a two-year period. See id. at 140-55 (setting
forth the Task Force's conclusions and recommendations); App. A (setting forth the Task
Force's conclusions); App. B (setting forth the Task Force's recommendations). However, most
of the Final Report consists of an extensive literature review that was authored by the Task
Force Chair, Professor Waldo, and his assistant, Kathy Makinen. See Final Report, supra
note 1, at 13-21 (providing an overview of the research performed on the drugs-violence
relationship); see also id. at 156-202 (listing the sources referred to in the Final Report).
7 See THEODORE R. VALLANCE, PROHIBITION'S SECOND FAILURE 94 (1993) (explaining that
proponents of the criminal justice view favor (1) deterrence of illicit behavior through fear of
punishment, (2) prevention of illicit behavior through detention of offenders, (3) reform
through parole and rehabilitation while in prison, and (4) "socially acceptable vengeance on
wrongdoers").
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health view, which advocates treating the drug addiction that leads
some individuals to commit crime. 8 Traditionally, the criminal
justice view is associated with a "tough on crime" attitude that
attracts wide public appeal,9 while the public health view is
vulnerable to accusations of "coddling criminals."'10 Although now it
appears that this tension between views may be lessening," the
conflict was alive and well during the years preceding the Task
Force's development, and while its members were meeting. I
believe the tension also contributed, in part, to the Task Force's
ultimate demise and lack of consensus.
It is lamentable that the Task Force could not rise above its
differences and complete an approved final report incorporating
more thoroughly the varied expertise and backgrounds of its
members: academics, researchers, government officials, politicians,
and administrators. Then too, other factors interfered with this
goal. For example, during the Task Force years, a number of
individuals resigned from the Sentencing Commission and support
for the Task Force waned along with the dwindling of the
Commission's staff. At times I sensed unarticulated concerns that

8 See id. (noting that proponents of the public health approach advocate (1) discovery and
alleviation of the causes of drug abuse, (2) prevention of drug abuse through education, and
(3) affordable drug treatment for individual users); see also EVA BERTRAM, ET AL., DRUG WAR
POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 198 (1996) (explaining that proponents of the public health
view support the notion that a person who is addicted to drugs is "considered a persodi with a
health problem in need of care, not a criminal in need of punishment"); Bonnie Steinbock,
Drug Prohibition: A Public-HealthPerspective, in DRUGS, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 217, 227,
229, 235-36 (Steven Luper-Foy & Curtis Brown eds., 1994) (explaining that the public-health
approach requires education about the dangers of drug abuse); App. B (recommending a
public health approach that includes (1) coordination of particular community services,
including law enforcement, social service providers,, schools and business owners, (2)
improving the quality of life in inner cities through access to schools, police, hospitals and
recreation facilities, and (3) providing educational prevention programs to children with
learning and behavioral problems within those communities).
9 See Christopher S. Wren, Top U.S. Drug Official Proposes Shift in Criminal Justice
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1999, at A23 (noting that politicians and law enforcement officials
are skeptical of the value of treating criminals for drug addiction).
10 See id. (explaining the need for a challenge to "the notion that treating addicts
amount[s] to being soft on crime"); see also VALLANCE, supra note 7, at 94 (stressing that
although the public health view advocates alternatives such as treatment and education,
crimes that are the consequence of drug use "would remain ... punishable under existing
codes").
1' See Wren, supra note 9 (discussing the recent shift in criminal justice policy by Gen.
Barry R. McCaffrey, the White House's Director of National Drug Policy, who has proposed a
strategy to incorporate drug testing and treatment in all phases of the criminal justice process
because the criminal justice system is a "disaster" that results in the incarceration of
thousands of drug offenders who are not being treated for the addictions that caused their
imprisonment).
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the Task Force's effort was simply too politically charged and
uncomfortable.
Regardless of the disappointing outcome, however, the Task
Force's Chair and members 12 deserve applause for even attempting
to resolve such a politically heated topic. The Task Force's initial
optimism and spirit were well founded: there had been much
13
criticism of the drug laws, and there was a great need for change.
Moreover, recent trends seemingly support a number of the Final
Report's proposals. 14 This change suggests that the Task Force's
mix of goals and backgrounds is a preferred approach for
understanding comprehensively the difficult and important problem
of drugs and violence even though it may also hinder a clear group
consensus.
Part I of this Essay presents briefly the Task Force's primary
purpose and goals, most particularly, the study of the
interrelationship between drugs and violence without presuming
the nature, direction, or even existence of any sort of a causal link
between the two. 15 Parts 1116 and III17 examine, respectively, the
Task Force's conclusions and recommendations, which span a very
wide range. Part IV concludes that although some bad things
happened to the Task Force (its abrupt end and lack of unity), some
good things happened too. i8
The production of a rich and
comprehensive Final Report could not have been accomplished
without such a varied Task Force membership. Future efforts may
want to capitalize on group disagreements by producing a report
providing majority and minority views so that individuals
representing different interests may have their say. Despite the
lack of consensus, it became clear that the Task Force's ideological
discord could result in a fresh perspective, thereby offering changes
and strategies unmatched by thoroughly unified efforts.
The
disunity that appeared to be a bad thing with the Drugs->Violence

See supra note 1 (listing the Chair and members of the Task Force).
is See Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Is It Time to Change the Rockefeller DrugLaws?, 13 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 613, 614 (1998) (noting that there has been much debate regarding the
fairness and effectiveness of New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws, culminating in calls for their
repeal).
14 See infra note 85 and accompanying text (noting that a recent proposal from the White
House's drug czar "mirrors directly what the Final Report suggested").
15 See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 55-85 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (noting that the benefits of the Task
Force's diversity in membership far exceeded the hindrances).
12
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Task Force can be the very thing that makes forthcoming efforts
effective and worthwhile.
I. THE TASK FORCE GOALS
The Task Force's primary purpose was to better comprehend the
link between drugs and violence without assuming the presence or
direction of a causal relationship. 19 For example, a key concern was
whether there was any such relationship at all or, alternatively,
whether there were many types of relationships. 20 Assuming there
was a relationship, the Task Force acknowledged the different
possible directions that relationship could take: drugs may cause
crime, criminality may lead to drug use, or there could be some sort
of reciprocal relationship in which crime caused drug use, which in
turn caused further crime, which increased and heightened prior
drug use, etc. 21 The Task Force also left open whether any of these
effects would be direct, indirect, both, or neither, all the while
realizing that any causal relationship was likely to be complex and
22
difficult to find.

The Task Force's refusal to presume any causal link between
drugs and violence already contravened the motivating force behind
many, if not most, of the more stringent drug statutes, such as the
Rockefeller Drug Laws. 23 Moreover, the Task Force engaged in an

19 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that while there is a common perception
that drugs cause violence, research often disputes this relationship, which indicates the need
for further study).
20 See id. (asserting that the Task Force was not founded upon assumptions regarding
either the existence or direction of a causal relationship).
21 See id. at 4 (stressing that while many different kinds of drugs-violence relationships
were acknowledged as possibilities, their existence was left an open question).
22 See id. There is evidence to support at least seven different ways of explaining the
relationship between drugs and violence:
1) Drug use causes people to engage in criminal behavior.
2) People who commit crimes are more likely to become drug users.
3) Criminal behavior and drug use are closely related but neither causes the other, they
are both products of the same set of background conditions that produce an interrelated
set of deviant practices sometimes referred to as a "general deviance syndrome."
4) It doesn't matter which came first because drug use and criminal behavior exist in a
reciprocal relationship so that criminal behavior increases drug use and then drug use
increases criminal behavior, and a feedback loop continues between the two.
5) Criminal behavior usually occurs before drug use, but heavy drug use greatly
increases the frequency and seriousness of the criminal behavior.
6) The relationship between drug use and criminal behavior varies depending on the
different types .of drug abuse.
7) There is no relationship between drug use and criminal behavior.
Id. at 124.
23 See Tsimbinos, supra note 13, at 633 (documenting executive and judicial presumptions
of a relationship between drugs and crime).
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extensive, multifaceted effort to study the relationship by (1)
examining all the major reviews of the research published in the
area as well as the most important original studies on the drugsviolence link, (2) funding four original studies further investigating
the relationship, (3) inviting experts to present their research,
opinions, and conclusions on major drugs-violence topics, (4)
discussing the research findings among the Task Force members,
and (5) applying all the substance gleaned by the research and
expert presentations in drafting the Task Force's conclusions and
24
recommendations.
One of the Task Force's major problems was defining or clarifying
certain key terms to ensure a comprehensible dialogue among its
members, who demonstrated a range of diverse backgrounds. 25 For
example, the Task Force devoted a substantial amount of time
defining the key words "violence" ("overt behavior directed by one
person against another, intended to inflict physical pain or
injury') 26 and "drug" ("any substance that produces a psychoactive
effect when introduced into the human body"). 27 Similarly, there
was much focus on which topics the Task Force would not discuss;
for example, whether to exclude the topic, the legalization and/or
decriminalization of drugs, provoked long and heated debate. 28
believed
that
Whereas
some
Task
Force
members
legalization/decriminalization might provide at least a partial
solution to the violence stemming from illegal drug markets, other
members were convinced that legalization/decriminalization would
only worsen the drug-violence problem and enhance the total
amount of harm attributable to drugs.28 Similarly, even though
Task Force members believed that some legal drugs, such as

24 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 4 (setting forth the components of the Task Force that

allowed it to accomplish its purpose).
25 The members of the Task Force recognized the importance of clarifying the concepts,
"drugs" and "violence," so that the terminology would
1) correspond to general usage in the context in which it is to be used, 2) be suited to the
tasks to which it will be put, 3) include those elements that users commonly have in
mind when they use the term being defined, and 4) exclude elements which might be
confused with, but which do not belong with, the elements in (3).

Id. at 5.
26 Id.

27 Id. at 7. As the Final Report explains, this definition of "drug" represents a compromise
between the competing concerns of including and excluding too many types of drugs. See id.
28 See id. at 9 (noting that because the Task Force did not systematically examine the

multitude of complicated issues involved with the legalization and/or decriminalization of
drugs, it was not prepared to comment on the subject).
29 See id. (highlighting the debate surrounding the pros and cons associated with the
legalization and decriminalization of drugs).
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alcohol, could be relatively more harmful than illegal drugs, past
difficulties
linked
with Prohibition
suggested
that the
criminalization of legal substances is not effective. 0 All this
groundwork laid the foundation for addressing the Task Force's
"charge":
to "determine the most important and most valid
conclusions that can be reached concerning the potential
31
relationship(s) between drugs and violence." '
II. THE UNRECONCILED TASK FORCE CONCLUSIONS
The Final Report's conclusions3 2 were unreconciled because Task
Force members could not reach a unanimous consensus approving
all of them.88 Because the Final Report was written after the Task
Force's last group meeting, it is difficult to know which aspects of
the
conclusions
concerned
which
disagreeing
members.
Presumably, most of the Task Force's academics probably accepted
the conclusions; however, it is likely that other members found some
or all of the conclusions politically troublesome given that many
seemed to counter the criminal justice view.
The underlying framework for the Final Report's conclusions and
the Task Force's study of the drugs-crime relationship was based on
Paul Goldstein's model proposing three different ways in which
drugs could possibly increase violence: (1) psychopharmacological
violence-violent crime committed as a result of an individual's drug
consumption which is typically accompanied by impulsive and/or
irrational behavior, (2) economically compulsive violence-violent
crime, such as robbery, committed by drug addicts to support their
expensive drug habit, and (3) systemic violence-violent crime
committed by individuals participating in the illegal drug market
who cannot rely on the criminal justice system for protection or
8 4
enforced compliance to drug contracts.
Examination of Goldstein's model required a broad review of the
many types of drugs/violence research (e.g., animal studies vs. cross
sOSee id. at 9-10 (noting that excessive consumption of alcohol and nicotine, both of which
were at one time illegal, leads to more loss of life than all other drugs combined).
31 Id. at 7; infra note 74 (reiterating the purpose of the Task Force).
32 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 140-43 (setting forth the Task Force's conclusions);
App. A (same).
33 The Task Force's dilemma parallels the lack of consensus found among other experts.
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 140-43 ("Most experts agree there is some type of

relationship between drugs and violence, but significant issues concerning its causality,
direction, form, magnitude and importance still must be determined."); App. A (same).
34 See Paul J. Goldstein, The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A TripartiteConceptual Framework,
15 J. DRUG ISSUES 493, 494-502 (1985).
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cultural variations), the many types of drugs (ranging from legal
drugs, such as alcohol, to illegal drugs, such as crack and opiates),
and mediating or confounding variables, such as patterns of drug
use over time or the type of community in which most drug use
occurred.3 5 One of the Task Force's more intriguing questions,
however, concerned the direction of the drug-crime relationship:
Does drug use lead to criminality or does aggressive and/or criminal
6
behavior lead to drug use?
The Final Report concluded that drug-crime relationships were
not nearly as clear or as strong as politicians and legislatures had
37
presumed based upon the motivations for enacting the drug laws.
Moreover, whether any link existed at all depended upon which of
the three types of drugs-violence relationships was being examined
and the quality of the research available. 8 For example, research
showed that both property and violent crime were more strongly
associated with the selling of drugs as compared to the ingestion of
drugs.8 9 This finding provided some support for the existence of
systemic violence, but contradicted widespread beliefs about the
existence of psychopharmacological violence. 4°
In addition,
considerable evidence pointed to an association between illegal drug
markets and violent crime, especially aggravated battery and
murder. 41 Some research demonstrated a link between drugs and
economically compulsive violence, most particularly during
individuals' withdrawal from a drug, especially heroin; however,
35 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 22-122 (examining, in depth, the multitude of studies
performed with regard to the possible relationship between the use of various types of drugs
and violence).
86 See id. at 124-39 (discussing at least seven different ways to explain the relationship
between drugs and violence); see also supra note 22 (listing the seven ways).
37 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 140-43 ("There is so much variability across drugs
that it is difficult to make broad generalizations that apply to all types of drugs, certainly as it
involves the drugs and violence relationship."); App. A (same).
38 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 26-122 (reporting the varying levels of correlation
between violence and drugs within the three drug categories).
9 See id. at 141 (stating that "[t]his supports the logic of systemic violence but runs
counter to a psychopharmacological interpretation"); App. A (reporting that the Task Force
found there to be a small amount of violence associated with economically compulsive
behavior).
40 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 26-97, 106-22, 141 (noting that the evidence of a
stronger relationship between drug use and property crime, as compared to drug use and
violent crime, further undermines the "psychopharmacological interpretation"); App. A
(same).
41 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 26-96, 106-22, 140-43 ('Research suggests, and there
is general agreement among the experts, that systemic violence represents the major form of
drug related violence."); App. A (concluding, based on a thorough examination of the research
available, that there is in fact a stronger relationship between selling drugs and violence than
there is between using drugs and violence).
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violence was typically used only as a last resort.4 2 Overall, there
was greater empirical support for systemic violence relative to
either economically compulsive or psychopharmacological violence.4 3
Regardless, the nature and extent of systemic violence is still not
entirely clear or strong, and it appears to vary across time and
different types of drug markets."
Studies also showed that a number of drugs-violence relationships
were counter-intuitive: for example, some drugs (e.g., opiates and
marihuana) tend to decrease rather than increase violent
behavior.45 Similarly counter-intuitive is the direction of the causal
relationship: research suggests that criminal behavior generally
precedes, rather than follows, drug use. 46 Other viable explanations
propose that drugs and violence share the same causal factors.4 7
Regardless of the direction and source of the relationship, however,
the kinds of social problems contributing to both drugs and violence
cannot be eliminated by the criminal justice system alone; other
social institutions must become involved. 48
The Final Report's most controversial conclusion concerned the
then-current policies and programs, which included the conviction
42 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 98-105, 141-42 (reporting that "it does not appear that
the proportion of addicts who engage in violent crimes to support their drug habit is very
large"); App. A (same).
43 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 78-122 (presenting and evaluating the research
available for all three types of violence).
44 See id. at 106-22, 142 (concluding that the four drug markets-local, export, import and
public-produce varying degrees of violence although overall, systemic violence is the main
problem); App. A (same).
45 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 52-77, 141 (reporting that the Joint Committee of the
ABA and AMA on Narcotics and Drugs, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence, the National Commission of Marijuana and Drug Abuse and the National Research
Council Panel, concluded that opiates "may be one of the least dangerous drugs" with regard
to violence, and that "'[d]uring the past two decades, five major scientific reviews of the
research literature have concluded that violent human behavior is either decreased or
unaffected by cannabis use"); App. A (noting that the evidence is counter-intuitive to a drugsviolence relationship with regard to marijuana, opiates, LSD, and "alcohol in large
quantities").
46 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 124-31, 142. The research performed with regard to
the relationship between drugs and crime has led researchers to abandon the notion that drug
use causes crime. See id. This is due to the many recreational drug users whose drug use did
not result in violent crime, and the increasingly popular position that criminals are more apt
to become drug users. See id. at 124. "There is a growing consensus that involvement in
criminal behavior precedes involvement with drugs, rather than drug use leading to criminal
behavior." Id. at 142; App. A.
47 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 124-31, 142 (noting the possibility of a causal order,
whereby drug use and violence are caused by the same factors); App. A (same).
48 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 144 (calling for a coordinated effort of the criminal
justice system, communities and neighborhoods to "take an active role in the war against
drugs and violence"); App. B (same).
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and long-term imprisonment of large numbers of drug offenders.
There was no evidence that such policies decreased either drug use
or violence; moreover, there had actually been increases in both
types of behaviors among youth. 49 The Final Report concluded that
the retention of such policies, premised on the belief that drugs
cause violence, could hinder the adoption of other, more
appropriate, remedies. 50
From a social scientist's viewpoint, such conclusions seem

sensible in light of the available drugs-violence research. 51 There
also appeared to be minimal debate about many of these general
52
findings among the Task Force's social science academics.
However, it is not surprising that there could be disagreement
among the other Task Force members with political, administrative,
and governmental affiliations.
The Final Report's conclusions
53
countered many, if not most, of the existing programs and policies.
The Task Force's unanimous agreement with the Final Report
would, in effect, concede that the criminal justice system's goals and
procedures in the drugs-violence area were nearly entirely
misguided. 54 Understandably, the representative of a highly visible
ex-officio Task Force member could feel that adhering to such
conclusions was simply too politically risky, particularly at a time
when the criminal justice view was dominant.

49 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 143 ("Specifically, there is no research evidence
showing that convicting and imprisoning large numbers of drug offenders for long periods of

time has reduced violence or drug abuse. To the contrary, under current policy, there have
been increases in both violent and drug-related behavior among youth."); App. A (same).
50 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 143 (suggesting that the reason "drugs cause violence"

beliefs will hinder the adoption of more appropriate remedies is that "the perceived
connection between drugs and violence may... lead policymakers to use drugs as a 'proxy' for
violence in an attempt to do something about the latter"); App. A (same).
51 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 143 (noting that the Final Report's conclusions were
generally consistent with the findings of other groups that have examined the drugs-violence
relationship in the past); App. A (same).
52 It bears reminding that the Task Force never had an opportunity to discuss together the
Final Report's conclusions. See supranotes 5-6 and accompanying text (noting that the Final
Report was never agreed upon by all of the members). I am assuming a general level of
agreement among the social science academics based upon the Task Force's discussions on
similar types of issues.
53 See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Final Report's conclusion
that "drug-crime relationships were not nearly as clear or as strong as politicians and
legislatures had presumed," and stressing that the current policy of long-term imprisonment
of large numbers of offenders is not an effective weapon in the war against drugs).
5 See Final Report supra note 1, at 145 (criticizing the methodology employed in past
efforts to control drugs and violence, which, at the expense of the "demand side," sought to
control the "supply side"); App. B (same).
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III. THE UNRECONCILED TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Final Report's recommendations55 varied in the extent to
which they deviated from then-current beliefs and practices. 56 The
Task Force agreed with the broad recommendations that
established the Final Report's general themes and backdrop.
However, Task Force members did not agree on many of the more
specific, and perhaps more controversial, recommendations. 57
A. Broad Recommendations
The general themes proposed in the broad recommendations
included the Task Force's recognition that violence and drug abuse
are long-standing social problems that will not be solved quickly. 58
Although the causes of drugs and violence are not entirely clear, it
appears that both are linked to social conditions in American
society; 59 however, solving one problem (drugs) was not likely to
solve the other (violence).60 Moreover, past drug control efforts had
inappropriately emphasized the supply side. 61 Future efforts should
focus on the demand side. 62 Many demand reduction programs were
likely to have beneficial results. At the same time, demand
programs should be initiated on an experimental basis because
there is inadequate evidence to address key concerns, such as 'what
works,' 'for whom,' and 'under what circumstances.' 63 Regardless of
the nature and origins of the drugs-violence problem, however, the
Task Force agreed that the media exaggerated the danger

55 See Final Report, *supra note 1, at 144-55 (setting forth the Final Report's
recommendations); App. B (setting forth the Final Report's recommendations with some
modifications).
6 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 145-55 (discussing the Final Report's
recommendations and their relation to current practices); App. B (same).
57 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 145 (listing those items the Task Force was able to
agree upon); App. B (same).
58 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 144-55 (commenting that violence and drug abuse "did
not appear overnight" and there are "no abrupt solutions"); App. B (same).
59 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 145 (listing racism, poverty, de-industrialization,
unemployment, and dysfunctional families as factors that intensify the problems of violence
and drug abuse); App. B (same).
60 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 145 ("It may be necessary and perhaps more
appropriate to seek separate solutions for each problem."); App. B (same).
61 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 145 (criticizing past drug control efforts); App. B
(same).
62 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 145 (suggesting that the root of the drug problem may
be undesirable social conditions found in American society); App. B (same).
63 Final Report, supra note 1, at 145; App. B (same).
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associated with it.64 The public fear and social responses spurred by
65
media accounts at times appeared to make matters worse.
B. Specific Recommendations
The Final Report's specific recommendations comprised four
categories: (1) guidelines-related, (2) criminal justice policy, (3) noncriminal justice policy, and (4) research. 66 Of the four categories,
most
the guidelines-related
recommendations
were the
67
others.
by
embraced
firmly
been
controversial although they have
The Final Report's guidelines-related
recommendations
pinpointed specific provisions and/or policies that seemed
ineffective, inaccurate, or misleading. For example, the Report
recommended the repeal of mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes because they had little effect on career or repeat high-end
offenders (the targeted group), but rather impacted on low-end
offenders who did not warrant lengthy custody.6 8 Moreover, the
Report proposed the reexamination of the role of drug quantity in
the determination of offense levels in drug cases for two primary
reasons: (1) drug quantity was viewed to be an inaccurate gauge of
an individual's culpability, and (2) drug quantity was considered to
cause the most injustice in sentencing for low-end individuals who
held a minor role in large quantity drug offenses. 69 Similarly, the
Report suggested a reexamination of the definition of "relevant
conduct" in the realm of drug offenses because the high-quantity
drug distribution behavior of high-end offenders should not be
attributed to low-end individuals.70 The law enforcement spotlight
64 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 145 (recognizing that although drugs and violence are
big problems, "the images created by the media ... are frequently disproportionate to the
magnitude of the real problems"); App. B (same).
65 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 145 (asserting that the societal response is over
exaggerated); App. B (same).
66 See Final Report, supranote 1, at 145; App. B.
67 See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, MeasuringCulpability by MeasuringDrugs? Three Reasons
to Reevaluate the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 63 ALB. L. REV. 777 (2000) (criticizing the
Rockefeller drug laws due to the removal of judicial discretion in sentencing and culpability
based on the quantity of drugs possessed).
6 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 146 (recommending the repeal of mandatory minimum
sentencing statutes because career or repeat offenders "usually end up with guideline
calculations in excess of the mandatory minimum," thereby limiting the guideline's effect on
them); App. B (same).
69 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 146 (suggesting an offense level calculation based on a
defendant's role in the offense); App. B (same).
70 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 146 (proposing a more accurate way of measuring
culpable conduct with respect to drug offenses, for example, "[t]he requirement of 'jointly
undertaken criminal activity"'); App. B (same).
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should be directed toward drug trafficking king pins, "the most
serious type of drug offender." 71 Lastly, the Report recommended
focusing on the violence/dangerous weapons components of drug
offenses. 72 This focus would help distinguish the penalties for
violence and firearms in drug offenses from those penalties designed
73
for drug type and quantity.
Once again, it is understandable that those Task Force members
with political, administrative, or governmental experience, would
not want to side with recommendations that diverged so far from
currently accepted policies. In contrast, the academics would be
relatively less constrained politically. Whether such disparate
groups could ever agree on specific guidelines changes is
unanswerable, although such a goal was implied (if not explicitly
v4
stated) when the Task Force was created.
Specific recommendations for the remaining three categories
seem less controversial, although they are potentially more
intrusive and costly. 75 With regard to criminal justice policy, for
example, recommendation of a system of universal drug testing
following arrest for serious offenses may invoke two issues: 1)
privacy concerns for those individuals generally opposed to drug
testing of any sort (or drug testing in this kind of context), and (2)
financial concerns given the kinds of resources needed to institute
such a system.7 6 Alternatively, this strategy could be considered a
cost saving device in the long run because it could prevent some of
the most serious (resource-dominating) offenses from ever entering

Final Report, supranote 1, at 147; App. B (same).
See Final Report, supra note 1, at 147 (suggesting a reexamination of the "grading and
quantity-leve' penalties to allow for consideration of a specific drug's harmfulness and its
association with violence); App. B (same).
73 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 147 (advocating the distinction between penalties for
violence and firearms from other types of drug offenses, in light of "a changing association
between drug type, its marketing structure, and the accompanying systemic violence"); App.
71
72

B (same).
7

See Final Report, supra note 1, at 7 (asserting the Task Force's "purpose" as follows:

"Based on a careful review of the best research currently available, and any additional
information available to the task force, determine the most important and most valid
conclusions that can be reached concerning the potential relationship(s) between drugs and
violence"); see also supranote 31 and accompanying text (same).
7- See Final Report, supra note 1, at 144-55
(setting forth the Task Force's
recommendations); App. B (same).
76 See Peggy Fulton Hora, et al., TherapeuticJurisprudenceand the Drug Treatment Court
Movement: Revolutionizing the CriminalJustice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime
in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 521, 533 (1999) (discussing concerns that have been
raised with regard to drug treatment programs, such as the sacrifice of prisoners' rights and
the cost of such programs).
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the criminal justice system.7 7 Moreover, this public health view of
drug offending should be regarded as relatively less stigmatizing
and privacy-invading than past efforts because the major goal is to
find appropriate treatment for a particular kind of drug problem,
rather than a punishment.7 8 While further discussion of these
issues is beyond the bounds of this Essay, the issues highlight the
potential value of merging the criminal justice and the public health
79
views.
Specific recommendations concerning law enforcement-such as
the expansion of community policing and the design of enforcement
policies that cater to the different types of drug markets-appear
sensible in light of the available social science research.8 0 They also
mesh well with the proposals offered to reform other parts of the
criminal justice system: (1) court, prosecution, and sentencing (such
as alternative sentencing options appropriate for drug offenders)
and, (2) treatment, such as developing linkages between the
criminal justice and public health systems.8 '
Most of the specific recommendations for the remaining two
categories (non-criminal justice policy and research questions), seem
uncontentious. For example, it is difficult to imagine Task Force
members quibbling about the value of improving:
(1) the
community coordination of different groups (city services,
community residents etc.) to collaborate in their drug and crime
control strategies, (2) the quality of life in the inner city, and (3)
further research on the effectiveness of sanctions.8 2 Presumably,
some Task Force members could be troubled about the extent of the
intrusiveness of some proposals, particularly those involving
children (for example, identifying and providing interventions for
children with learning and behavior problems). However, such
83
interventions already exist and they have proven effective.
77 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 147-50 (explaining that drug testing would recognize a

serious drug addiction problem, which could be used to direct drug addicted persons through
alternative sentencing mechanisms); App. B (same).
78 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 147-50 (proposing that the information gained from
universal drug testing could be used in assigning appropriate treatment); App. B (same).
79 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 147-52 (summarizing both the criminal justice and
public health views and highlighting the similarities between the two); App. B (same).
8DSee Final Report, supra note 1, at 148-49 (recognizing that changing law enforcement
strategies would have a positive affect on drug and related violent crimes); App. B (same).
s See Final Report, supra note 1, at 147-48 (advocating expanded drug treatment and
violence control programs throughout the criminal justice system); App. B (same).
82 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 150-55 (discussing the non-criminal justice policy
recommendations and research questions recommended for study); App. B (same).
83 See Preventing Drug Use Among Children and Adolescents (last modified Apr. 18, 1997)

<http://www.nida.nih.gov/PreventionlPREVOPEN.html> (summarizing some successful youth
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Moreover, General Barry R. McCaffrey, the White House's Director
of National Drug Policy, has proposed an aggressive strategy of
drug testing and treatment for every phase of the criminal justice
system, ranging from arrests to imprisonment and post prison
release. 84 McCaffrey's proposal mirrors directly what the Final
85
Report suggested.
In general, it seems that the greatest conflict among Task Force
members concerned the guidelines-related recommendations.
Regardless, the Final Report appears to have predicted the nature
and changing direction of current policies.
IV. A FINAL WORD ON THE TASK FORCE
The Drugs-*Violence Task Force was created to examine the
interrelationship between drugs and violence in a way no earlier
commission or task force had attempted. In order to approach this
goal comprehensively, the Task Force consisted of individuals from
a range of disciplines and backgrounds (e.g., academics and those
with political, administrative, and governmental positions). The
members' diverse backgrounds contributed a wealth of perspective
on the drugs-violence problem and enabled coverage of issues that
may well have been neglected with a narrower group. Ironically,
however, this rich blend also most likely hindered attempts toward
unanimous
agreement
on
the
many
conclusions
and
recommendations offered in the Task Force's Final Report. During
Task Force meetings, disagreement about drugs and crime issues
often appeared to reflect the traditional tension between the
criminal justice view, which advocates detecting and punishing drug
offenders, 86 and the public health view, which promotes treating
87
drug addiction to prevent crime.
The Task Force's lack of consensus need not be regarded
regrettably nor pessimistically, however.
First, without the
diversity in the Task Force's membership, topic coverage would
intervention programs already in place such as Project STAR, Life Skills Training Program,
and Project Family).
84 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing McCaffrey's strategy as one trying
to reconcile the criminal justice approach and the public health approach).
85 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 147 (recommending implementation of universal drug
testing following arrest of serious offenders and using the test results to inform sentencing
and treatment decisions); App. B. (same).
86 See supra notes 7, 9 and accompanying text (explaining, in further detail, the ideology of
the criminal justice view).
87 See supra notes 8, 10 and accompanying text (explaining, in further detail, the ideology
of the public health view).
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have been far more confined. Second, despite the diversity of the
Task Force members' backgrounds, the Final Report demonstrates
an initial attempt to reconcile the criminal justice and public health
perspectives on drugs and violence.8 8
This integration of
perspectives reflects the Clinton administration's current
treatment-oriented approach to drug offenders in the criminal
justice system, a marked contrast to prior policies. 89 Lastly, it
seems that unanimous agreement may be an unrealistic goal for a
Task Force of such disparate members, irrespective of the nature of
the subject matter. Had the Task Force been granted more
opportunities to meet, it is conceivable that the Final Report would
have comprised two parts: (1) recommendations representing the
majority of Task Force members, and (2) dissenting positions
representing the remaining members. Presumably, some Task
Force members may not have wanted to be associated with a report
in which their views were frequently, or even occasionally, in the
minority. On the other hand, if such a standard were made clear at
the start of joining the Task Force, some members might welcome
the chance to express and explain their disagreement.
A summary of the two-year Drugs--,Violence Task Force effort is
reflected in this Essay's title. Some bad things did happen to the
Task Force's goals and good intentions. The Task Force was never
able to complete its mission and group members lacked consensus.
Yet, some good things occurred as well. Perhaps the most valued
lesson learned from the Task Force experience is that such
endeavors are well worth the ideological discord accompanying
them. Moreover, if such discord can be made visible in future final
reports representing a range of views and interests, it may not be
such a bad thing after all. The demise of the Sentencing
Commission's Drugs-)Violence Task Force suggests two future
goals for similar efforts: (1) embrace group members' disagreement,
and (2) implement the effective changes and strategies that might
accommodate it.

88 See Final Report, supra note 1, at 144-55 (discussing recommendations based on both
the public health approach and the criminal justice approach); App. B (same).
89 See Wren, supra note 9 (stating "[tihe Clinton administration's top official on drug policy
has proposed a strategy of integrating drug testing and treatment into virtually every phase
of the criminal justice process, from arrests to incarceration and after release from prison");
supra note 11 (recommending a shift to the public health approach, calling the current
approach a "disaster").
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APPENDIX A
TASK FORCE CONCLUSIONS 1

" Most experts agree there is some type of relationship
between drugs and violence, but significant issues
concerning its causality, direction, form, magnitude and
importance still must be determined.
" There is so much variability across drugs that it is
difficult to make broad generalizations that apply to all
types of drugs, certainly as it involves the drugs and
violence relationship.
" The most logical forms for the study of the relationship
between drugs and violence are: psychopharmacological
violence, economic compulsive violence and systemic
violence. There is varying research support for these
different forms.
Much of the "evidence" for a psychopharmacological
relationship for humans between illegal drugs and
There is some
violence is anecdotal in nature.
research supportive of a psychopharmacological
interpretation, but the relationship is weak,
variable-and in research using adequate controlshighly dubious. Findings from cross-cultural research
relationship
challenge a psychopharmacological
between drugs and violence.
For humans and other animals, the strongest
evidence for a psychopharmacological relationship
between drugs and violence is for alcohol, but that
relationship is neither strong nor consistent and
cross-cultural research questions its validity,
particularly for humans.

I See Preliminary "Final" Report to the United States Sentencing Commission from the
Drugs-+Violence Task Force 140-43 (June 27, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author and with Albany Law Review).
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" The psychopharmacological relationship between
alcohol and violence may be spurious. It appears
to be mediated by factors such as individual
proneness toward violence, social exceptions, and
cultural practices.
" There are relatively few studies using human
subjects and commonly
accepted research
procedures that have found a significant
psychopharmacological
relationship
between
ingestion of illegal drugs and violent crime.
" Some animal studies offer a measure of support
for a psychopharmacological relationship between
drugs (especially alcohol)
and aggression.
However, many of these findings are weak, the
measures of aggression are frequently not
comparable to violent crime, and the findings may
not be transferable to humans.
" Most
studies
with
humans
finding
a
psychopharmacological effect used paper-andpencil measures of aggression, or some other
artificial measure, rather than behavioral
measures of violence.
* For some drugs (amphetamines, barbiturates,
PCP, [inhalants]) there has not been very much
research on the psychopharmacological drugsviolence relationship. The paucity of research for
these drugs may be a partial explanation for the
lack
of
empirical
support
for
a
psychopharmacological relationship, but the best
research currently available fails to provide much
support for such a relationship.
Evidence
that is
counter-intuitive
to
a
drugs--+violence
psychopharmacological
relationship is found in research on some of the
illegal
drugs-opiates
and
marihuana
in
particular, and perhaps LSD-and even for
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alcohol in large quantities. These illegal drugs
(and alcohol under patterns of heavy usage) tend
to decrease rather than increase violent behavior.
While these findings are logical-given the known
chemical properties of the drugs, physiological
processes within the body, and cultural reasons
for using drugs-they are in direct opposition to a
psychopharmacological interpretation in which
drugs cause violence.
" There is a stronger relationship between illegal
drug use and property crime than there is between
illegal drug use and violent crime which runs
counter
to
a
psychopharmacological
interpretation.
" There is a stronger relationship between selling
drugs and crime (property and violent), than there
is between using drugs and crime. This supports
the logic of systemic violence but runs counter to a
psychopharmacological interpretation.
" There is some research indicating that a small portion
of violent crime is of the economic compulsive form.
Most of the support for an economic compulsive
relationship between drugs and violence is found
during withdrawal from a drug, heroin in
particular.
Research suggests, however, that
resorting to violence to obtain drugs is avoided
when possible and is used only as a last resort.
" There is considerable evidence for a relationship
between illegal drug markets and violence,
particularly aggravated battery and murder.
Such a systemic relationship was strong with
alcohol during prohibition, powder cocaine in the
1970's, and crack cocaine in the late 1980's and
early 1990's.
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While there is greater support for systemic
violence than for either economically compulsive
or psychopharmacological violence, the magnitude
of this relationship is unclear but not likely to be
very strong. It is likely to be highly variable
across time and for different types of drug
markets.
" There is a growing consensus that involvement in
criminal behavior precedes involvement with drugs,
rather than drug use leading to criminal behavior. Other
types of causal order are also possible (e.g. both drugs
and violence are caused by a common factor).
" Youth gangs are associated with violence, and individual
gang members may use drugs, but few youth gangs are
organized for the primary purpose of drug trafficking and
selling. If the number and relevance of gangs were
diminished, violence would likely be reduced, but it is not
likely that there would be any appreciable effect on drug
trafficking.
" While problems with drugs and violence may have their
own separate causes, they are part of a larger set of
interrelated social problems that can't be solved by the
criminal justice system alone. Involvement of other
social institutions will be necessary to address these
social problems.
" Treatment and prevention programs may prove effective
in reducing drug use and violence if they are approached
as experiments in progress rather than proven panaceas.
Proper evaluation designs, approval of administrators,
and funds for reasonable evaluations should be in place
before treatment and prevention
programs are
implemented for either drugs or violence.
" There is no research evidence showing that drug policies
over the last couple of decades have decreased drug use
or violence. Specifically, there is no research evidence
showing that convicting and imprisoning large numbers
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of drug offenders for long periods of time has reduced
violence or drug abuse. To the contrary, under current
policy, there have been increases in both violent and
drug-related behavior among youth.

" Adherence to and expenditures on policies that are based
on a belief in a causal relationship between drugs and
violence may prevent adoption of other policies that have
a greater potential for reducing drug-related harms.
With appropriate remedies for violence being very
elusive, the perceived connection between drugs and
violence may at times have lead policymakers to use
drugs as a "proxy" for violence in an attempt to do
something about the latter.
" The lack of strong data bases limits the ability to track
trends and assess policies related to both drugs and
violence.
Most of the conclusions stated in this report are generally
consistent with the findings and conclusions from earlier
commissions, committees, and task forces that have
examined research evidence concerning the drugsviolence relationship.
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APPENDIX B
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS'
BROAD RECOMMENDATIONS
" Violence and drug abuse represent important social
problems in American society. But neither drugs nor
violence is a new phenomenon. They have both existed in
the United States, and in most societies, throughout
recorded history. The problems did not appear overnight,
and answers are not forthcoming that will result in their
abrupt solutions.
" While violence and drug abuse are recognized as major
problems, it is also recognized that the images created by
the media, the public fear thus generated, and the
societal response, are frequently disproportionate to the
magnitude of the real problems and at times the response
may exacerbate rather than ameliorate these problems.
" The root causes of these problems are not completely
understood, but it seems apparent that both are
intensified, if not directly caused, by some of the social
conditions found in American society (e.g., racism,
unemployment,
de-industrialization,
poverty,
dysfunctional families).
" There are connections between drugs and violence, but
solving one problem is not likely to solve the other. It
may be necessary and perhaps more appropriate to seek
separate solutions for each problem.
" Efforts to control drugs in the past have relied too heavily
on the supply side at the expense of the demand side. A
greater emphasis needs to be placed on the demand side.
1 See Preliminary "Final" Report to the United States Sentencing Commission from the
Drugs-+Violence Task Force 145 (June 27, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author and with Albany Law Review) [hereinafter Final Report].
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Many demand reduction programs are likely to have
positive benefits, but the evidence is insufficient to
answer the questions of "what works," "for whom," and
"under what circumstances" with any reasonable degree
of certainty. Many promising programs should be tried,
but they should be initiated on an experimental basis
with a careful evaluation plan required.
SELECTED SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS2
GUIDELINES RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Repeal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes which
have little impact on career or repeat offenders-precisely
the individuals that should be targeted-because those
offenders usually end up with guideline calculations in
excess of the mandatory minimum. Instead, the mandatory
minimums hit the low-end offenders who are typically the
individuals that do not need to be in custody for ten or
twenty years.
2. Reexamine the role of drug quantity in the calculation of
offense levels in drug cases. This is considered by many to be
a misleading indicator of an individual's culpability for the
offense under indictment. It is also perceived to result in the
greatest unfairness in sentencing for those individuals who
played a minor role in a drug offense involving a large
quantity of drugs. Consider instead ways in which the role of
the defendant can have a greater impact on the offense level
calculations. Although the current guidelines consider role
in the offense, this factor is diluted in large quantity cases
because by the time the role adjustment is considered, the
adjustment for minor role has minimal impact given the
amount of time already earned by the quantity of drugs.

2

See id. at 146-55 (excerpt reprinted verbatim with modifications).
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4. Reexamine the definition of "relevant conduct" as it
relates to drug offenses. Quantities of drugs distributed by
higher-ups should not be attributed to lower-level people who
were not involved in those quantities. The requirement of
"jointly undertaken criminal activity" was a step in the right
direction, but didn't go quite far enough.
5. Reexamine the grading and quantity-level judgments for
specific drugs, with an eye toward their harmfulness and
association with violence. Place more of the focus on the
violence/dangerous weapons components of drug offenses.
6. Continue the emphasis on drug trafficking "king-pins" as
the most serious type of drug offender with special attention
to higher-level organizers, financiers, importers, and
managers of sophisticated drug trafficking organizations.
Separate "real traffickers" (king-pins) from "clockers" (streetcorner sellers) with the heavier penalties reserved for the
former.
7. Due to continually changing drug markets, and a changing
association between drug type, its marketing structure, and
the accompanying systemic violence, consider dissociating
the penalties for violence and firearms in drug offenses from
the penalties for drug type and quantity.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Drug Assessment
a. Institute a system of universal drug testing as soon as
possible following arrest for serious offenses or those in
which a substance abuse problem might be indicated.
b. Establish a system to provide alcohol or other drug
assessments for selected defendants. For those defendants
indicating a serious problem or addiction, utilize this
information in the diversion or sentencing decision process.
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c. Utilize the assessment process to determine assignment of
convicted offenders to prison-based, as well as communitybased, treatment.
2. Law Enforcement Issues
a. Design law enforcement strategies that take into
consideration the different types of drug markets. This could
attenuate market-related violence through effects on market
types, non-money costs of drug dealing, etc. Set enforcement
priorities according to which markets, participants and drugs
are most likely to be harmful.
b. Avoid "zero-tolerance" and other non-enforceable law
enforcement policies that may be perceived as external
threats by inner city youths and serve to coalesce and
stabilize gangs.
c. Expand community policing. Community policing is an
operation philosophy for neighborhood problem solving which
works proactively and reactively to address serious crime,
reduce fear, and improve the quality of life for all residents.
In areas where drugs and associated violence are problems,
citizens and police develop solutions that are responsive to
local conditions.
d. Law enforcement organizations should be encouraged to
coordinate efforts and share information between narcotic,
gang and violent crime enforcement units.
3. Court, Prosecution, and Sentencing Issues
a. Avoid early incarceration of all but the most seriouslyoffending youths.

d. Search for other alternative sentencing options that are
appropriate and cost-effective for dealing with drug
offenders.
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4. Treatment Issues
In general, using an experimental approach, expand the
availability of drug treatment and violence control programs
both in and out of prison. Develop and use linkages between
the criminal justice system and the treatment system.
Treatment should be available throughout the criminal
justice system-probation, corrections and parole-and in
the community in general.

NON-CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Focus on Community Coordination
a. Law enforcement, city services, community residents,
social service providers, schools, business owners and other
stakeholders should work together to develop comprehensive
and collaborative strategies to address the problems of drugs
and violence within their community. Federal funding
should be used to encourage such efforts. These coordination
efforts should be carefully evaluated, however, because some
of the similar efforts in the past have had questionable
impact.

2. Improve the Quality of Life in the Inner City
a. Involve the wider society in developing solutions to the
problems facing inner city communities.
b. Provide equitable services to the inner city, e.g., schools,
police, hospitals, recreation facilities.

f. Invest public money for economic development in the
inner city in order to restore jobs and provide alternatives to,
and exits, from gang life, drug selling, violence and the other
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activities associated with the underground economy of the
inner city.

3. Educational Prevention Programs
a. Identifying children with behavior and learning problems
and apply comprehensive interventions.

c. Work to change the norms in those subcultures which are
permissive of problematic drug use and violence by
conducting comprehensive educational efforts in the schools
Communicate anti-drug messages
and communities.
through the media and public role models.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS RECOMMENDED FOR STUDY

1. Research on Effectiveness of Sanctions
a. To what extent are penal sanctions other than
incarceration (for instance, coerced treatment) effective for
drug-addicted offenders?
b. To what extent, if any, do criminal sanctions impact on
drug-related violence?

2. Research on Systemic Violence
a. How much difference is there in the quantity and type of
violence related to different types of drug markets?
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c. What are the consequences of different law enforcement
practices relative to systemic violence?
3. Research on Treatment Effectiveness
a. Does drug treatment work? If so, for whom, for what
drugs, and under what circumstances?
b. Does violence control treatment work? If so, for whom, for
what types of violence, and under what circumstances?
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